Appendix A: Tabletop Exercises

This appendix collects all ten tabletop exercises from the book. Each exercise is a self-contained 60-90 minute scenario designed for classroom use, policy workshops, or professional development. Exercises are listed in chapter order and cross-reference the analytical frameworks and case material from their corresponding chapters.

Tabletop Exercise: Taiwan Strait Economic Coercion Crisis

Chapter: 1 - Foundations of Economic Statecraft in the 21st Century

Duration: 60-90 minutes

Learning Objectives:

Apply the framework of economic coercion (tools, targets, objectives, effectiveness) to a realistic crisis scenario
Analyze trade-offs between economic leverage, allied coordination, and escalation risks
Understand how Chinese and U.S. perspectives on sovereignty and economic interdependence shape crisis responses
Evaluate the effectiveness of different economic statecraft tools in a high-stakes environment

Scenario Overview

Date: January 15, 2026

Taiwan's newly elected president has announced plans to pursue formal constitutional changes that Beijing views as steps toward de jure independence. In response, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has initiated large-scale military exercises encircling Taiwan, including a partial naval blockade that disrupts commercial shipping. China has not declared war but characterizes the exercises as "internal law enforcement operations."

The United States faces pressure from Taiwan, Japan, and other Indo-Pacific allies to respond with both security guarantees and economic measures. However, the U.S.-China economic relationship remains deeply intertwined: China holds $850 billion in U.S. Treasury securities, bilateral trade exceeds $700 billion annually, and U.S. firms depend on Chinese supply chains for critical inputs. China, meanwhile, remains dependent on Taiwan for advanced semiconductors, U.S. semiconductor equipment, and access to Western financial systems.

You are members of the National Security Council Deputies Committee convened to develop economic response options for the President. The crisis is escalating, and decisions made in the next 48-72 hours may determine whether the situation resolves diplomatically, escalates to comprehensive economic warfare, or spirals into military conflict.

Participant Roles

National Security Advisor (NSA)

Responsibilities: Chair the meeting, synthesize recommendations for the President
Interests: Managing escalation, maintaining allied unity, protecting U.S. security interests
Constraints: Presidential directive to avoid military conflict if possible

Deputy Secretary of State

Responsibilities: Allied coordination, diplomatic options, international law
Interests: Maintaining alliance credibility, avoiding rupture with China, UN engagement
Constraints: Allies have divergent economic exposures to China

Deputy Secretary of Treasury

Responsibilities: Financial sanctions, dollar system, economic impact assessment
Interests: Financial system stability, minimizing market disruption, sanctions effectiveness
Constraints: Federal Reserve independence, market volatility, dollar weaponization concerns

Deputy Secretary of Commerce

Responsibilities: Export controls, semiconductor policy, technology restrictions
Interests: Protecting U.S. technology leadership, maintaining industry competitiveness
Constraints: Industry opposition, allied semiconductor firm dependencies

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Responsibilities: Military readiness, defense industrial base, operational requirements
Interests: Ensuring military capability, Taiwan defense, deterring Chinese aggression
Constraints: Reliance on Chinese rare earths, limited munitions stockpiles

Deputy Director of National Intelligence

Responsibilities: Intelligence assessment, adversary intentions, effectiveness estimates
Interests: Accurate intelligence, protecting sources/methods
Constraints: Intelligence gaps on Chinese leadership decision-making

Timeline and Injects

Phase 1: Initial Crisis Response (Minutes 0-20)

Inject 1: Blockade Tightens

China announces that all vessels approaching Taiwan must receive approval from Chinese maritime authorities. Three commercial cargo ships are turned away. Taiwan reports that PLA Navy vessels are stopping and inspecting merchant ships in international waters. Japan and South Korea express concern that their trade with Taiwan (including critical semiconductor imports) is being disrupted.

Intelligence Assessment: China appears to be implementing a "quarantine" rather than a full blockade, claiming authority to inspect vessels for military materials. However, the practical effect is severe disruption to Taiwan's trade. Beijing has mobilized economic ministries to implement potential counter-coercion against countries supporting Taiwan.

Key Questions:

Should the U.S. immediately announce economic sanctions, or wait to coordinate with allies?
Which economic tools provide the most leverage with acceptable escalation risk: financial sanctions, export controls, trade restrictions, or a combination?
How do you balance signaling resolve to Taiwan and allies against avoiding steps that make Chinese de-escalation politically impossible?

Phase 2: Allied Coordination and Chinese Threats (Minutes 20-45)

Inject 2: Allied Discord

Japan signals willingness to join coordinated sanctions but requests exemptions for energy imports from China. South Korea is hesitant, fearing Chinese economic retaliation against its auto and electronics exports. The EU issues a statement condemning the blockade but takes no concrete action. Taiwan urgently requests that the U.S. freeze Chinese assets and ban semiconductor equipment exports to China.

Inject 3: Chinese Counter-Threats

China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson warns that "countries interfering in China's internal affairs will face resolute countermeasures." Reports indicate China is preparing to:

Restrict rare earth exports to the U.S. and allies
Launch investigations into U.S. firms under Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law
Reduce purchases of U.S. Treasury securities
Ban U.S. agricultural imports
Cut off supply of critical pharmaceutical precursors

Key Questions:

How important is multilateral coordination, and are you willing to delay action to achieve it?
How do you assess the credibility of Chinese counter-coercion threats, and how would Chinese retaliation affect the U.S. economy and political sustainability of sanctions?
Should the U.S. implement "defensive" economic measures (e.g., diversifying supply chains, building stockpiles) before imposing sanctions on China?

Phase 3: Escalation and Decision Point (Minutes 45-70)

Inject 4: Maritime Incident

A U.S. Navy destroyer conducting a freedom of navigation operation is "painted" by Chinese targeting radar. No shots are fired, but tensions spike. The PLA announces an expanded military exercise zone that effectively closes the Taiwan Strait to commercial traffic.

Taiwan's president appeals directly to the U.S. President for "meaningful economic consequences" for China's actions. Domestic political pressure is mounting: both hawkish members of Congress and U.S. business groups are calling for action, though with very different recommendations.

Inject 5: Semiconductor Leverage

Taiwan's government indicates it is considering halting semiconductor exports to China (which would cripple Chinese tech industry) if the U.S. and allies take strong economic action. However, this would also disrupt global supply chains and harm TSMC's business model. China has reportedly put Chinese firms on notice to reduce dependencies on U.S. technology, accelerating indigenous semiconductor development regardless of cost.

Decision Required: The President needs recommendations within 24 hours on:

Which economic measures to implement, if any
Conditions for reversing those measures
Coordination strategy with allies
Mitigation of likely Chinese counter-coercion
Off-ramps for de-escalation

Key Questions:

Do you recommend comprehensive sanctions (SWIFT exclusion, asset freezes, export controls) or calibrated measures (targeted sanctions, limited export controls)?
What objectives are realistic: compelling China to end the blockade (compellence), deterring future aggression (deterrence), or degrading Chinese capabilities (denial)?
How do you sequence economic measures to preserve escalation options while signaling resolve?
What intelligence would change your assessment, and how do you hedge against uncertainty about Chinese decision-making?

Phase 4: Debrief and Analysis (Minutes 70-90)

Discussion Questions:

Effectiveness Assessment: Which economic tools provided the most leverage relative to costs? What made certain tools more or less effective?
Allied Coordination: How did divergent allied interests affect your strategy? Could you have structured measures to accommodate allied concerns while maintaining pressure?
Chinese Perspective: How might Chinese leaders interpret different U.S. actions? Which measures would Beijing view as crossing red lines versus acceptable responses?
Escalation Dynamics: Did economic coercion reduce or increase the risk of military conflict? How do you prevent an economic spiral that makes diplomatic off-ramps impossible?
Second-Order Effects: What long-term consequences would your chosen measures create for:
- U.S.-China economic relationship
- Dollar's role in international finance
- Allied trust in U.S. leadership
- Chinese pursuit of economic self-reliance
- Global economic stability
Domestic Politics: How sustainable is your chosen approach given U.S. domestic politics, economic interests, and public opinion?
Alternative Scenarios: How would your recommendations change if:
- China declared a full military blockade rather than a "quarantine"
- Taiwan took provocative actions (e.g., declaring independence) that complicated U.S. messaging
- Russia opened a simultaneous crisis in Europe, dividing U.S. attention and allied commitment

Background Materials

Key Authorities:

International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1708
Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-44
Export Control Reform Act (ECRA), 50 U.S.C. § 4811 et seq.
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), 22 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq.

Recent Precedents:

2022 Russia SWIFT exclusion and asset freezes
2022-2024 semiconductor export controls on China
2014 Russia sanctions following Crimea annexation
1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis

Economic Data:

U.S.-China bilateral trade: $700+ billion annually
Chinese holdings of U.S. Treasuries: ~$850 billion
Taiwan semiconductor exports to China: ~$140 billion annually
U.S. imports from China: ~$540 billion annually
U.S. exports to China: ~$195 billion annually

Strategic Context:

Taiwan Strait is world's most important semiconductor chokepoint (TSMC produces 90% of advanced chips)
China depends on food imports (80%+ soybean import dependence) but has substantial domestic grain production and reserves
U.S. remains dependent on Chinese rare earths (80%+ for some critical elements)
Global shipping: 50%+ of container traffic passes through South China Sea

Facilitator Notes

Setup:

Assign roles in advance if possible, allowing participants to review background
Provide one-page role sheets with specific responsibilities and interests
Have whiteboards or shared documents to track proposed measures and their effects

Time Management:

Phase 1: 20 minutes max - focus on immediate response options
Phase 2: 25 minutes - emphasize allied coordination challenges and Chinese counter-threats
Phase 3: 25 minutes - force concrete recommendations
Phase 4: 20-30 minutes - critical for extracting lessons

Common Pitfalls:

Participants defaulting to military rather than economic tools (redirect to economic focus)
Unrealistic assumptions about allied unity (emphasize divergent interests)
Treating Chinese responses as passive (inject credible counter-coercion)
Neglecting second-order effects and long-term consequences (probe these explicitly)

Extension Options:

Add roles for Chinese decision-makers to simulate red-teaming
Include a market response inject (stock market crash, dollar volatility)
Simulate a second iteration 6 months later to evaluate chosen strategy's sustainability

Variations:

For more experienced participants: Add complexity with simultaneous Middle East crisis dividing resources
For policy focus: Emphasize domestic political constraints and Congressional reactions
For economics focus: Provide detailed economic modeling of sanctions impact

Learning Outcomes

After completing this exercise, participants should be able to:

Apply the economic coercion framework to analyze tools (sanctions, export controls, financial measures), targets (state, firms, individuals), objectives (compellence, deterrence, denial), and effectiveness factors
Evaluate trade-offs between economic leverage and costs, immediate signaling and long-term sustainability, unilateral action and multilateral coordination
Understand adversary perspectives on how Chinese leaders might interpret different U.S. actions based on historical experiences and strategic objectives
Assess escalation risks inherent in weaponizing economic interdependence in a crisis environment
Recognize intelligence gaps and uncertainty in crisis decision-making about adversary intentions and resolve

Key Terms for Research

When searching databases and academic literature, use these terms strategically:

Economic sanctions, financial sanctions, secondary sanctions
Export controls, technology denial, dual-use controls
Economic coercion, economic statecraft, geoeconomics
Weaponized interdependence, chokepoint politics
IEEPA, OFAC, Entity List, SDN list
SWIFT exclusion, correspondent banking, dollar weaponization
US-China competition, technology competition, semiconductor policy
Rare earth elements, critical minerals, supply chain security

Tabletop Exercise: Semiconductor Chokepoint Crisis

Chapter: 2 - Supply Chain Vulnerabilities and Dependencies

Duration: 60-90 minutes

Learning Objectives:

Analyze chokepoint vulnerabilities in global supply chains
Evaluate tools for supply chain resilience and diversification
Understand trade-offs between economic efficiency and strategic autonomy
Assess effectiveness of export controls and investment restrictions in protecting critical supply chains

Scenario Overview

Date: March 2027

A major earthquake measuring 7.8 on the Richter scale strikes central Taiwan, causing significant damage to infrastructure in Hsinchu Science Park, home to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and dozens of supporting firms. While TSMC's advanced fabs have earthquake protection, several critical facilities suffer damage that will take 4-6 months to fully repair. TSMC announces that production of advanced 3nm and 5nm chips will be reduced by approximately 40% for at least four months.

Global markets react with panic. Within 48 hours, major automotive manufacturers announce production slowdowns due to anticipated chip shortages. Apple, NVIDIA, AMD, and Qualcomm stocks drop 15-20%. The White House receives urgent calls from industry leaders requesting government intervention.

Simultaneously, intelligence reports indicate that China is considering using this crisis as a "window of opportunity" to pressure Taiwan, potentially by offering emergency semiconductor supplies in exchange for political concessions. Chinese state media emphasizes that "the reunification of the motherland would prevent such vulnerabilities."

You are members of the National Economic Council and National Security Council convened to develop both immediate crisis response and longer-term supply chain resilience strategies.

Participant Roles

Director of National Economic Council (NEC)

Responsibilities: Coordinate economic policy response, balance industry and security interests
Interests: Economic stability, minimizing disruption, long-term competitiveness
Constraints: Limited ability to quickly increase production, industry resistance to government direction

Deputy Secretary of Commerce

Responsibilities: Export controls, domestic semiconductor policy, industry liaison
Interests: Supporting U.S. semiconductor industry, maintaining technology leadership
Constraints: CHIPS Act funding already allocated, limited leverage over private firms

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Responsibilities: Defense industrial base, military systems dependent on advanced chips
Interests: Ensuring military access to cutting-edge semiconductors, preventing Chinese advantage
Constraints: Defense programs face multi-year delays if chip supplies interrupted

Deputy Secretary of State

Responsibilities: Diplomatic coordination with Taiwan, allies, and China
Interests: Supporting Taiwan, managing China relations, allied coordination
Constraints: Taiwan is sovereign in semiconductor decisions, allies have competing interests

Deputy Secretary of Treasury

Responsibilities: Market stability, economic impact assessment, sanctions if needed
Interests: Preventing market panic, maintaining economic growth
Constraints: Cannot directly control private markets, fiscal limits on subsidies

CEO Representative (Private Sector Advisor)

Responsibilities: Represent major tech firms dependent on TSMC supply
Interests: Restoring chip supply, protecting market position, avoiding government overreach
Constraints: No authority over TSMC, competitive pressures, shareholder accountability

Timeline and Injects

Phase 1: Immediate Crisis (Minutes 0-20)

Inject 1: Supply Chain Assessment

Initial assessments indicate:

Apple: 60% of advanced chips sourced from damaged facilities; iPhone production at risk
Auto industry: Already fragile chip supplies; this will force plant closures within weeks
Defense contractors: Weapons systems requiring advanced chips face delays
Data center operators: AI chip shortages will slow cloud infrastructure expansion

TSMC requests U.S. assistance with specialized equipment and materials to accelerate repairs. Japanese and Dutch lithography equipment manufacturers are offering expedited support, but Chinese firms are offering immediate alternative production capacity at older nodes.

Key Questions:

What immediate steps should the U.S. government take to manage the crisis: emergency CHIPS Act funding, Defense Production Act authorities, diplomatic coordination?
Should the U.S. encourage or discourage firms from using Chinese alternative production capacity?
How do you balance market forces (allowing firms to source chips wherever available) against security concerns (preventing Chinese leverage over U.S. tech industry)?

Phase 2: Chinese Pressure and Allied Divergence (Minutes 20-45)

Inject 2: China's Strategic Offer

China's government announces an emergency program offering to prioritize semiconductor production for "Chinese and friendly markets" to compensate for Taiwan's disruption. Chinese state-owned firms contact major U.S. tech companies offering guaranteed chip supplies for the next 12 months at favorable prices.

Taiwan's government reports that Beijing has quietly communicated that "unnecessary tensions and provocations" could affect China's willingness to provide economic assistance during Taiwan's recovery. Intelligence suggests China may be preparing to restrict rare earth exports needed for semiconductor manufacturing as additional leverage.

Inject 3: Allied Semiconductor Competition

South Korea: Samsung announces major production expansion but prioritizes Korean and European customers; hints that U.S. export control cooperation depends on preferential access
Japan: Willing to expedite equipment to Taiwan but requests U.S. reconsider restrictions on Japanese firms selling to Chinese customers
EU: Announces €20 billion emergency semiconductor fund; Commissioner publicly criticizes U.S. "America First" semiconductor policy

Key Questions:

How do you prevent Chinese economic leverage over U.S. firms without driving them to bankruptcy?
What incentives or requirements should accompany any government assistance to industry?
How do you coordinate with allies who have competing semiconductor ambitions?

Phase 3: Long-Term Strategy Decision (Minutes 45-70)

Inject 4: Strategic Choices

Intelligence assessment projects:

TSMC Taiwan recovery: 4-6 months to 80% capacity, 12-18 months to full capacity
China accelerating indigenous semiconductor development; may achieve 7nm production within 2 years
U.S. domestic fab construction (CHIPS Act funded): Still 2-3 years from volume production

Industry coalition proposes:

$50 billion emergency fund for domestic fab acceleration
Waiver of certain environmental reviews to speed construction
Government-backed insurance for semiconductor supply disruptions
Relaxation of export controls to allow U.S. firms to maintain Chinese market share

National security team proposes:

Mandatory supply chain diversification requirements for critical industries
Stricter export controls to prevent any advanced technology reaching China
Strategic reserve of critical semiconductors (similar to oil reserve)
Accelerated TSMC Arizona production even at higher costs

Inject 5: Taiwan Vulnerability

Taiwan's president publicly states that the earthquake demonstrates the need for international support for Taiwan's security, linking semiconductor supply reliability to Taiwan's political status. This draws sharp Chinese condemnation and veiled military threats.

U.S. firms express concern that overly politicizing semiconductors will damage business relationships and innovation ecosystems. Some suggest the U.S. should separate economic and security issues to maintain industry competitiveness.

Decision Required: Recommendations for:

Immediate crisis mitigation (0-6 months)
Medium-term resilience building (1-3 years)
Long-term supply chain restructuring (3-10 years)
Policy toward China's semiconductor industry and firms using Chinese capacity
Allied coordination and burden-sharing

Key Questions:

How much economic inefficiency and cost is acceptable to achieve supply chain security?
Should the government mandate private sector behavior (e.g., prohibit using Chinese chips) or rely on incentives?
What is the right balance between allied diversification (Europe, Japan, Korea) and domestic reshoring?
How do you handle the tension between maintaining U.S. semiconductor competitiveness and denying China access to advanced technology?

Phase 4: Debrief and Analysis (Minutes 70-90)

Discussion Questions:

Chokepoint Vulnerability: What made Taiwan semiconductors such a critical chokepoint? Could this vulnerability have been reduced through prior policy choices?
Resilience vs. Efficiency: How did you balance the economic costs of diversification/reshoring against security benefits? What metrics should guide this trade-off?
Private Sector Coordination: How did you align private sector incentives (profitability, market share) with national security objectives? Were mandates or incentives more effective?
Allied Coordination: Why is coordinating semiconductor policy among allies difficult? How did you structure burden-sharing?
China Strategic Leverage: How did you prevent China from using the crisis to gain leverage over Taiwan or U.S. firms? Did your approach reduce or increase long-term Chinese leverage?
Unintended Consequences: What second-order effects might your policies create:
- Impact on U.S. tech industry innovation and competitiveness
- Chinese response (accelerated self-reliance, retaliation)
- Allied relations and trust
- Global semiconductor market structure
Timeframe Mismatches: How did you manage the gap between immediate needs (chips now), medium-term buildout (2-3 years), and long-term restructuring (5-10 years)?

Background Materials

Key Authorities:

CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, Pub. L. 117-167
Defense Production Act, 50 U.S.C. § 4501 et seq.
Export Control Reform Act (ECRA), 50 U.S.C. § 4811 et seq.
Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR) for semiconductors

Supply Chain Data:

Taiwan market share: ~60% global semiconductor foundry capacity, 90% most advanced chips
U.S. dependencies: ~75% of U.S. semiconductor purchases from Asia
Defense systems: F-35, satellite systems, missile guidance all require advanced chips
China market: ~35% of global semiconductor consumption
Leading-edge fabs: TSMC (Taiwan), Samsung (Korea), Intel (U.S.)

Economic Impact:

Semiconductor industry: $600 billion annually
Dependent industries: $8 trillion+ (electronics, auto, aerospace, medical devices)
2021 chip shortage: Estimated $240 billion in lost auto industry revenue
Average fab construction time: 3-5 years, $10-20 billion cost

Recent Precedents:

2021-2022 global chip shortage following COVID-19 disruptions
October 2022 U.S. semiconductor export controls on China
CHIPS Act $52 billion in subsidies for domestic semiconductor production
TSMC Arizona fab construction (2024-2025 target for production)

Facilitator Notes

Setup:

Have participants review semiconductor supply chain basics before exercise
Provide simple map showing global semiconductor production nodes
Consider inviting private sector guest to play CEO role for added realism

Time Management:

Phase 1: Focus on immediate triage; prevent lengthy technical discussions
Phase 2: Emphasize difficult choices between security and competitiveness
Phase 3: Force specific recommendations with timelines and resource allocations
Phase 4: Extract generalizable lessons about chokepoint vulnerabilities

Common Pitfalls:

Assuming domestic production can quickly replace Taiwan (it cannot)
Underestimating costs of supply chain restructuring ($100s of billions, many years)
Treating "allied coordination" as automatic (allies have competing interests)
Neglecting innovation impacts of restricting global collaboration

Extension Options:

Add China military pressure on Taiwan during crisis
Include second natural disaster (e.g., drought affecting Taiwan fab water supply)
Simulate industry resistance to government mandates (strikes, lawsuits)
Add congressional hearing where participants must defend their choices

Learning Outcomes

After completing this exercise, participants should be able to:

Identify chokepoint vulnerabilities in complex supply chains and assess systemic risks
Evaluate resilience strategies including diversification, reshoring, stockpiling, and redundancy
Balance competing objectives of economic efficiency, national security, allied coordination, and industry competitiveness
Understand limitations of government tools to rapidly restructure global supply chains
Assess long-term strategic implications of supply chain policy for U.S.-China competition and allied relationships

Tabletop Exercise: Critical Minerals Crisis and Supply Disruption

Chapter: 3 - Critical Sectors and Strategic Resources

Duration: 60-90 minutes

Learning Objectives:

Analyze vulnerabilities created by concentrated control of critical minerals
Evaluate tools for building strategic reserves and diversifying supply sources
Understand environmental, economic, and geopolitical trade-offs in resource security
Assess effectiveness of retaliation and counter-coercion in resource conflicts

Scenario Overview

Date: June 2027

Following a U.S. decision to impose new tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and solar panels under Section 301, China announces "temporary export controls" on gallium, germanium, and several rare earth elements "for national security reasons." The measures require Chinese exporters to obtain licenses for shipments to "unfriendly countries," which in practice means the United States and allies supporting the tariffs.

China produces 98% of global gallium, 60% of germanium, and dominates rare earth processing (85%+ global capacity). These materials are critical for:

Defense: Missile guidance systems, radar, satellite communications, night vision equipment
Clean energy: Wind turbines, electric vehicle motors, solar panels
Electronics: Smartphones, fiber optics, semiconductors, LED lighting

Within two weeks, U.S. defense contractors report critical shortfalls. Prices for available gallium spike 400%. Major renewable energy projects face delays. The Pentagon warns that missile production and F-35 maintenance could be affected within 3-6 months.

Allied reactions are mixed: Japan and Australia support U.S. tariffs but need rare earth access; the EU opposes tariffs and seeks separate accommodation with China. Several African and Latin American countries with potential rare earth deposits are courting both U.S. and Chinese investment.

You are convened as an interagency task force to develop immediate responses and long-term critical mineral security strategy.

Participant Roles

Deputy National Security Advisor

Responsibilities: Coordinate national security response, manage escalation
Interests: Protecting defense capabilities, avoiding military vulnerability
Constraints: Limited short-term options to replace Chinese supplies

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Responsibilities: Defense industrial base, military readiness, weapons production
Interests: Ensuring defense contractors can maintain production
Constraints: Strategic stockpile limited, alternative sources need years to develop

Deputy Secretary of Energy

Responsibilities: Clean energy transition, critical mineral supply chains
Interests: Advancing renewable energy deployment, energy independence
Constraints: Wind and EV industries dependent on Chinese rare earths

Deputy Secretary of Commerce

Responsibilities: Industrial policy, mining sector development, trade policy
Interests: Building domestic critical mineral capacity, supporting U.S. industries
Constraints: Environmental regulations, permitting delays (5-10 years for new mines)

Deputy Secretary of Interior

Responsibilities: Federal lands, mining permits, environmental protection
Interests: Balancing resource development with conservation
Constraints: Environmental groups oppose accelerated mining, indigenous land rights

EPA Administrator

Responsibilities: Environmental regulations, mining waste, community impacts
Interests: Protecting environment and public health
Constraints: Rare earth processing creates toxic waste, limited U.S. processing capacity

Timeline and Injects

Phase 1: Immediate Supply Crisis (Minutes 0-20)

Inject 1: Defense Production at Risk

Pentagon assessment shows:

Raytheon: 4-month supply of gallium for missile production; will halt new production within 90 days
Lockheed Martin: F-35 maintenance requires rare earth magnets; current stockpile lasts 6 months
Northrop Grumman: Satellite systems require germanium; limited alternatives
General Dynamics: Night vision equipment production affected immediately

Defense contractors request:

Emergency release of Defense National Stockpile materials
Defense Production Act authority to prioritize their access to global supplies
Relaxation of export controls to source from any available supplier (including Russian or Iranian intermediaries)

Key Questions:

Should the U.S. immediately release strategic stockpile materials, even though current stocks are limited and building new reserves could take years?
Do you prioritize defense over clean energy industries for available rare earth supplies?
Should the U.S. retaliate with its own export controls on critical goods where it has leverage (e.g., specialized equipment, agricultural products)?

Phase 2: Allied Divergence and Alternative Sources (Minutes 20-45)

Inject 2: Allied Fragmentation

Japan: Proposes joint U.S.-Japan rare earth stockpile but requests U.S. share costs; has some existing stockpiles
Australia: Willing to accelerate Lynas rare earth production but needs $2 billion U.S. investment and technology transfers; production increase takes 18-24 months
EU: Refuses to join any counter-measures against China; negotiating separate rare earth supply agreement with Beijing
South Korea: Caught between U.S. alliance and economic dependence on China; seeking to stay neutral

Inject 3: Problematic Alternative Sources

Several alternative supply options emerge, all with complications:

Myanmar: Has rare earth deposits but controlled by military junta under U.S. sanctions; Chinese firms already operating there
Greenland: Rare earth deposits available but Denmark/Greenland hesitant due to environmental concerns and Chinese influence
Central Asia: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have deposits but require massive infrastructure investment and have close Russia/China ties
Democratic Republic of Congo: Cobalt and some rare earths available but severe governance, human rights, and environmental concerns
Domestic (California, Alaska): Mountain Pass mine could increase production but faces environmental lawsuits; expansion requires 2-3 years and $500 million+

Key Questions:

How do you balance speed (sourcing from problematic suppliers) versus values (human rights, environment, sanctions compliance)?
What investments should the U.S. make in alternative sources, knowing they won't help the immediate crisis?
How do you coordinate with allies who have different interests and China dependencies?

Phase 3: Strategic Decisions and Escalation Risk (Minutes 45-70)

Inject 4: China Escalates

Intelligence reports that China is:

Offering long-term rare earth contracts to European firms if they oppose U.S. tariffs
Increasing rare earth shipments to Russia and Iran as geopolitical favor
Restricting neodymium (critical for EV motors) to pressure U.S. auto industry
Using rare earth leverage to demand U.S. remove sanctions on specific Chinese tech firms

Chinese state media declares that "those who seek to contain China will find their own development contained."

Inject 5: Domestic Political Pressure

Defense industry: Demands government action; warns of military readiness gaps
Clean energy sector: Warns that wind and EV production will collapse; blames administration's China policy for crisis
Environmental groups: Oppose fast-tracking domestic mining; file lawsuits against emergency permits
Labor unions: Support domestic mining for jobs but demand environmental and safety protections
Congress: Bipartisan criticism; hearings scheduled; legislation proposed to mandate domestic rare earth production

Decision Required: Long-term critical minerals strategy including:

Immediate crisis mitigation (stockpile release, emergency imports, rationing)
Medium-term diversification (investments in alternative sources, allied coordination)
Long-term self-reliance (domestic production, recycling, substitution R&D)
Response to Chinese coercion (retaliation, accommodation, or de-escalation)
Policy reforms (permitting, environmental regulations, subsidies, strategic reserves)

Key Questions:

How much economic cost and environmental compromise is acceptable to achieve critical mineral security?
Should the U.S. retaliate with its own export controls, knowing this escalates economic conflict?
What is the right balance between domestic production (slow, expensive, environmental concerns) and diversified imports (faster but still creates dependencies)?
How do you structure long-term contracts and investments to ensure supply reliability?

Phase 4: Debrief and Analysis (Minutes 70-90)

Discussion Questions:

Vulnerability Assessment: How did concentrated Chinese control of rare earths create coercive leverage? Could this vulnerability have been reduced earlier?
Resilience vs. Cost: Domestic rare earth production is 2-3x more expensive than Chinese supply. How do you justify taxpayer and consumer costs for supply security?
Environmental Trade-offs: Rare earth mining and processing create environmental damage. How did you balance environmental protection against resource security?
Allied Coordination: Why was allied unity difficult? How could burden-sharing be structured to align incentives?
Retaliation Calculus: If the U.S. retaliates with its own export controls, does this escalate toward economic decoupling? What are the risks and benefits?
Long-term Strategy: What mix of stockpiling, diversification, domestic production, recycling, and substitution research is optimal?
Unintended Consequences:
- Impact on clean energy transition if rare earths become scarce/expensive
- Chinese response to U.S. efforts to reduce dependence
- Environmental and indigenous community impacts of accelerated mining
- Precedent for future resource weapon ization
China's Perspective: From Beijing's viewpoint, why use rare earths as leverage? What does this reveal about Chinese strategic thinking?

Background Materials

Key Authorities:

Defense Production Act, 50 U.S.C. § 4501 et seq.
Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act, 50 U.S.C. § 98 et seq.
Energy Act of 2020 (critical minerals provisions)
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (rare earth programs)

Critical Mineral Data:

Chinese rare earth production: 60% of mining, 85%+ of processing
U.S. imports: 80% of rare earth elements from China (2019)
Defense uses: $500 million+ annually in rare earths for weapons systems
Clean energy: Each wind turbine requires ~500 kg of rare earths; each EV motor ~1-2 kg
Price volatility: Previous Chinese restrictions (2010-2011) caused 10x price spikes

Alternative Sources:

U.S. domestic: Mountain Pass (California) only operating mine; several deposits in Alaska, Wyoming
Australia: Lynas Corporation, second-largest rare earth processor
Greenland: Kvanefjeld deposit, politically sensitive
Recycling: Currently <1% of rare earths recycled; technology improving

Recent Precedents:

2010 Japan-China rare earth dispute following Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands incident
July 2023 China export controls on gallium and germanium
U.S. government studies identifying rare earths as critical vulnerability (2017, 2019, 2021)

Facilitator Notes

Setup:

Provide simple chart showing rare earth supply chain (mining → processing → manufacturing)
Have participants review basics of rare earth uses before exercise
Consider field trip video or images of rare earth mining environmental impacts

Time Management:

Phase 1: Focus on immediate triage and prioritization
Phase 2: Emphasize difficult trade-offs (speed vs. values, cost vs. security)
Phase 3: Force concrete recommendations with budgets and timelines
Phase 4: Extract lessons about resource dependencies and strategic competition

Common Pitfalls:

Assuming domestic production can quickly replace imports (takes 5-10 years minimum)
Underestimating environmental obstacles to mining expansion
Treating "alternative sources" as fungible (each has unique political/technical issues)
Neglecting clean energy impacts (delays renewable deployment)

Extension Options:

Add simultaneous crisis in another critical mineral (lithium, cobalt)
Include China offering to negotiate if U.S. makes concessions on Taiwan
Simulate environmental lawsuit halting expedited mining permits
Add competing demands from private sector for rare earths (tech vs. defense vs. energy)

Learning Outcomes

After completing this exercise, participants should be able to:

Assess critical mineral vulnerabilities and identify systemic dependencies on concentrated suppliers
Evaluate resilience strategies including stockpiling, diversification, domestic production, recycling, and substitution
Navigate environmental and social trade-offs inherent in critical mineral security
Understand limitations of rapid supply chain restructuring and time required for new production
Analyze adversary leverage and develop counter-coercion strategies

Tabletop Exercise: AI Export Control Dilemma

Chapter: 4 - Technology and Innovation Competition

Duration: 60-90 minutes

Learning Objectives:

Analyze effectiveness and limitations of technology export controls
Evaluate trade-offs between denying adversary capabilities and harming domestic industry
Understand challenges of controlling dual-use technologies with global development
Assess allied coordination in multilateral technology restrictions

Scenario Overview

Date: September 2027

A classified intelligence report reveals that China has made breakthrough progress in developing advanced AI models for military applications, including autonomous weapon systems, intelligence analysis, and cyber warfare tools. The AI models rival OpenAI's GPT-5 and Google's Gemini Ultra in capability.

Investigation reveals that Chinese progress was enabled by:

Illegally obtained NVIDIA H100 GPUs smuggled through third countries despite export controls
Recruitment of Chinese-American AI researchers who worked at U.S. labs
Massive government investment in AI supercomputing infrastructure using slightly older but still capable chips
Stolen training data and model architectures from U.S. companies via cyber espionage

The Department of Defense warns that Chinese AI-enabled military systems could narrow or eliminate U.S. technological advantage within 2-3 years if current trends continue. However, U.S. AI companies warn that tighter export controls would:

Eliminate their largest foreign market (China represents 25% of revenue for some firms)
Slow AI development by reducing scale and investment returns
Push China toward complete self-reliance, creating competing global AI standards
Drive talented researchers away from the U.S. if they cannot collaborate globally

You are convened as the Technology Policy Coordination Committee to recommend export control and AI security policies.

Participant Roles

Deputy National Security Advisor

Responsibilities: Balance security and economic interests, coordinate policy
Interests: Preventing Chinese military AI advantage, maintaining U.S. technological leadership
Constraints: Allied support needed for controls to be effective

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Responsibilities: Military technological advantage, defense applications of AI
Interests: Denying China AI capabilities for autonomous weapons, ISR, cyber warfare
Constraints: DoD also depends on commercial AI development (most AI innovation in private sector)

Deputy Secretary of Commerce

Responsibilities: Export controls (BIS), technology industry competitiveness
Interests: Effective controls without destroying U.S. industry
Constraints: Industry opposition, enforcement challenges, allied coordination needed

Deputy Secretary of State

Responsibilities: Allied coordination, multilateral export control regimes
Interests: Maintaining allied unity, preventing proliferation
Constraints: Allies have different China exposures and tech industry interests

CEO of Major AI Company (Private Sector Advisor)

Responsibilities: Represent AI industry perspective
Interests: Maximizing markets and talent access, preventing fragmentation
Constraints: Shareholder pressure, competition from Chinese AI firms

FBI Deputy Director

Responsibilities: Counterintelligence, technology theft investigations
Interests: Preventing espionage and illegal technology transfers
Constraints: Cannot monitor all researchers, legal restrictions on surveillance

Timeline and Injects

Phase 1: Assessment and Options (Minutes 0-20)

Inject 1: Intelligence Briefing

The intelligence community reports:

China's AI progress is 12-18 months behind cutting-edge U.S. models but closing gap rapidly
Chinese military is integrating AI into command/control, autonomous systems, cyber operations
Current export controls are being circumvented via Singapore, Malaysia, UAE transshipment
Over 500 Chinese-origin researchers work at leading U.S. AI labs; some maintain China ties
Chinese firms are designing AI chips to work around U.S. export restrictions

Technical assessment shows controlling AI requires addressing:

Hardware: Advanced GPUs/AI chips (current export control focus)
Software: AI frameworks, model architectures, training algorithms
Data: Large datasets needed for training
Talent: AI researchers and engineers
Cloud computing: Access to U.S.-based AI training infrastructure

Key Questions:

What is the primary objective: delay Chinese AI development, deny specific military applications, or maintain U.S. lead?
Which elements (hardware, software, data, talent, cloud) should be controlled, and how?
How do you prevent circumvention when AI technology is globally distributed?

Phase 2: Industry and Allied Reactions (Minutes 20-45)

Inject 2: Industry Pushback

Major U.S. AI companies present impact analysis:

NVIDIA: Proposes "middle ground" AI chips for export - powerful but limited for military use; warns full ban costs $10 billion annually
OpenAI/Anthropic: Argue controlling model weights is impractical (easily copied); propose verification systems instead
Microsoft/Google: Warn that losing Chinese market funding will slow global AI development; suggest tiered access based on use cases
Meta: Points out open-source AI models cannot be controlled; advocates focusing on downstream military applications only

Industry threatens:

Lobbying Congress to block stringent controls
Moving AI development overseas to avoid U.S. restrictions
Reducing cooperation with government on AI safety research

Inject 3: Allied Divergence

Netherlands (ASML): Will not restrict AI chip lithography equipment sales without WTO-consistent controls
Taiwan (TSMC): Caught between U.S. pressure and economic dependence on Chinese market
UK/EU: Developing separate AI governance frameworks; resistant to export controls that harm competitiveness
South Korea (Samsung): Willing to coordinate but requests compensation for lost Chinese sales
Japan: Supports controls but fears driving China toward complete self-reliance

Key Questions:

How do you address industry concerns while achieving security objectives?
What concessions or incentives bring allies into coordinated export control regime?
How do you control open-source AI when models and code are freely published?

Phase 3: Escalation and Strategic Choices (Minutes 45-70)

Inject 4: Chinese Response

China announces:

Counter-controls: Export restrictions on AI training data services and labeled datasets
Talent restrictions: Exit bans on Chinese AI researchers; incentives for overseas Chinese researchers to return
Alternative ecosystem: $100 billion fund for indigenous AI development; mandatory use of Chinese AI models for domestic applications
Legal retaliation: Investigations of U.S. AI companies under Anti-Monopoly Law and Data Security Law

Chinese AI development appears to accelerate in response to controls, with government directing unlimited resources toward self-sufficiency.

Inject 5: Espionage and Enforcement Challenges

FBI reports:

Attempted theft of proprietary AI model weights from U.S. company by insider
Chinese intelligence recruiting AI researchers at academic conferences
Covert Chinese access to U.S. cloud computing for AI training via shell companies
Illegal GPU shipments discovered but likely only small fraction of total smuggling

Commerce Department reports export control violations are difficult to prove and prosecute; companies argue they are complying with "letter of law" while finding creative workarounds.

Decision Required: Comprehensive AI technology security strategy including:

Export control scope (hardware only, or also software/models/cloud access?)
Enforcement mechanisms and resources
Allied coordination and burden-sharing
Researcher mobility and security policies
Domestic AI development acceleration programs
Offramps and criteria for adjusting controls

Key Questions:

Do comprehensive controls that harm U.S. industry make America more or less secure in the long run?
How do you prevent controls from accelerating Chinese self-reliance rather than creating dependency?
What is enforceable given AI's digital, globally distributed nature?
Should controls focus on capabilities (all advanced AI) or specific applications (military AI)?

Phase 4: Debrief and Analysis (Minutes 70-90)

Discussion Questions:

Effectiveness Assessment: Can export controls significantly delay Chinese AI development, or do they merely reduce U.S. industry revenue while China achieves self-reliance anyway?
Dual-Use Challenge: AI is inherently dual-use (civilian and military applications inseparable). How do you control military applications without restricting beneficial civilian innovation?
Industry Incentives: How did you align profit-seeking private companies with national security objectives? Were carrots (subsidies, market protection) or sticks (mandatory controls) more effective?
Talent and Openness: The U.S. AI lead depends on attracting global talent and open research collaboration. How do you balance openness with security?
Allied Coordination: Why is AI export control coordination harder than Cold War-era CoCom? How sustainable is multilateral cooperation when allies have competing interests?
Strategic Logic:
- If controls work: Does delaying Chinese AI create window for U.S. to build insurmountable lead?
- If controls fail: Do they still impose costs on China (slower, more expensive development)?
- Unintended consequences: Accelerating Chinese AI industry, fragmenting global AI ecosystem
Long-term Vision: What is the end state - permanent technological bifurcation, temporary delay until negotiated AI arms control, or failed attempt at containment?
Alternative Approaches: Rather than export controls, should strategy emphasize:
- Outcompeting through superior investment and innovation
- International AI safety governance reducing proliferation risks
- Defensive measures (counterintelligence, securing U.S. models) rather than denying China access

Background Materials

Key Authorities:

Export Control Reform Act (ECRA), 50 U.S.C. § 4811 et seq.
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130
Commerce Control List (CCL) for emerging technologies
Executive Order 14110 on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy AI

AI Technology Basics:

Advanced AI models require: (1) powerful compute (GPUs/TPUs), (2) large datasets, (3) sophisticated algorithms, (4) skilled talent
Current export controls: October 2022 controls on NVIDIA H100/A100 GPUs to China
Chinese AI industry: Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, SenseTime, ByteDance developing competitive models
Military AI applications: Autonomous weapons, intelligence analysis, cyber operations, decision support

Economic Data:

Global AI market: $200 billion (2023), projected $2 trillion by 2030
China AI market: ~25% of global market
U.S. AI industry: Leads globally but dependent on international talent and markets
Cost to train frontier AI model: $100 million - $1 billion

Recent Precedents:

October 2022 semiconductor export controls on China
October 2023 expanded controls on AI chips and Chinese AI companies
Wassenaar Arrangement multilateral export control coordination
Entity List designations for Chinese AI firms (e.g., SenseTime, Megvii)

Facilitator Notes

Setup:

Provide brief AI technology primer before exercise
Consider showing AI military application examples (autonomous drones, intelligence tools)
Have industry representative role-play actual company arguments

Time Management:

Phase 1: Establish technical and strategic context
Phase 2: Emphasize difficult trade-offs between security and competitiveness
Phase 3: Force decision on enforcement and allied coordination
Phase 4: Extract lessons about controlling rapidly advancing, globally distributed technologies

Common Pitfalls:

Assuming export controls can "bottle up" AI (technology spreads globally)
Underestimating Chinese capability for indigenous development
Treating allied coordination as automatic (significant divergence)
Neglecting second-order effect of driving Chinese self-reliance

Extension Options:

Add AI safety crisis (uncontrolled autonomous weapon incident)
Include Chinese AI breakthrough that leapfrogs U.S. capabilities
Simulate congressional hearing on AI policy
Add ethicist role to raise AI arms race concerns

Learning Outcomes

After completing this exercise, participants should be able to:

Analyze dual-use technology control challenges when civilian and military applications are inseparable
Evaluate export control effectiveness for rapidly advancing, globally distributed technologies versus traditional goods
Navigate industry-government tensions when national security and commercial interests conflict
Assess multilateral coordination challenges in technology controls
Understand strategic competition dynamics where controls may accelerate rather than prevent adversary development

Tabletop Exercise: Submarine Cable Sabotage and Digital Infrastructure Crisis

Chapter: 5 - Information, Standards, and Digital Infrastructure

Duration: 60-90 minutes

Learning Objectives:

Analyze vulnerabilities in global digital infrastructure
Evaluate information controls as tools of statecraft
Understand trade-offs between connectivity and security
Assess attribution challenges and response options to infrastructure attacks

Scenario Overview

Date: March 2028

Multiple submarine fiber-optic cables connecting Taiwan to the global internet are simultaneously damaged in suspected sabotage. The cables, which carry 99% of Taiwan's international data traffic, suffer breaks at different points on the ocean floor. Taiwan's internet connectivity to the outside world drops by 80%.

Initial reports suggest the damage occurred near cable landing stations but deep underwater, making immediate repair impossible. Repair ships will require 4-6 weeks to fix all breaks. Commercial satellite capacity cannot fully compensate for the lost bandwidth.

Intelligence suggests Chinese fishing vessels and a survey ship were operating near the cable routes shortly before the breaks occurred. However, attribution is uncertain - breaks could be sabotage, accidents, or natural causes (underwater landslides, earthquakes).

Taiwan alleges deliberate Chinese sabotage as part of hybrid warfare strategy. China denies involvement and suggests Taiwan is fabricating claims to garner international sympathy. The crisis creates immediate impacts on Taiwan's economy, financial sector, and ability to coordinate with allies.

Participant Roles

Deputy National Security Advisor

Responsibilities: Coordinate U.S. response, manage escalation
Interests: Supporting Taiwan, deterring Chinese aggression, maintaining crisis stability
Constraints: Attribution uncertainty, escalation risks

Deputy Secretary of State

Responsibilities: Diplomatic response, allied coordination, public messaging
Interests: Building international support for Taiwan, avoiding military escalation
Constraints: Weak international law on submarine cable protection

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Responsibilities: Military posture, cyber operations, infrastructure protection
Interests: Deterring further Chinese aggression, protecting U.S. cables
Constraints: Limited military options for cables, attribution challenges

Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security

Responsibilities: Critical infrastructure protection, domestic cable security
Interests: Protecting U.S. internet infrastructure from similar attacks
Constraints: Most cables privately owned, international waters

CISA Director

Responsibilities: Cybersecurity, critical infrastructure resilience
Interests: Ensuring U.S. digital infrastructure security
Constraints: Limited jurisdiction over international infrastructure

FCC Chairman

Responsibilities: Telecommunications regulation, spectrum allocation
Interests: Maintaining global communications, satellite backup systems
Constraints: Regulatory authority limited to U.S. territory

Timeline and Injects

Phase 1: Initial Response (Minutes 0-20)

Inject 1: Economic and Security Impact

Within 48 hours of cable damage:

Taiwan stock exchange trading volume drops 60% (unable to handle international transactions)
TSMC reports disruptions in coordinating with global customers and suppliers
Taiwan's banks cannot process international wire transfers reliably
U.S. companies with operations in Taiwan face communications blackouts
Taiwan military reports degraded coordination capabilities

Taiwan requests:

Emergency satellite communications support
U.S. intelligence on who damaged cables
International condemnation and investigation
Protection for repair ships (fears Chinese interference)

Key Questions:

Without definitive attribution, what is appropriate U.S. response?
Should the U.S. provide military escort for cable repair ships if Taiwan requests?
What immediate steps can help Taiwan maintain critical communications?

Phase 2: Attribution and Chinese Pressure (Minutes 20-45)

Inject 2: Intelligence Assessment

NSA/CIA provide classified assessment:

Likely: Chinese state-sponsored sabotage (fishing vessels, survey ships operated near cables before breaks)
Possible: Accidental damage from anchor dragging or fishing gear
Unlikely: Natural causes (no seismic activity)
Confidence: Medium (circumstantial evidence, no smoking gun)

Intelligence also reveals:

China mapping global submarine cable networks using survey ships
Chinese firms involved in cable manufacturing and repair (potential access/vulnerability)
Russia previously conducted cable surveillance operations; potential cooperation with China

Inject 3: Expanding Targeting

New reports indicate:

Undersea cable damage detected between Japan and U.S. (Guam) - minor disruption, suspicious timing
Increased Chinese drone and surface vessel activity near cable routes in South China Sea
Chinese state media publishes articles on "cable vulnerabilities" and how fragile global connectivity is

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman suggests Taiwan "provoked this crisis with reckless separatist rhetoric" and should bear consequences.

Key Questions:

At what point does cable sabotage constitute an act of war or trigger mutual defense obligations?
How do you deter future attacks when attribution is difficult to prove publicly?
Should the U.S. issue public warnings to China despite attribution uncertainty?

Phase 3: Strategic Response and Escalation Control (Minutes 45-70)

Inject 4: Escalation Options

Military proposes:

Increased naval patrols near critical cable routes
Classified retaliatory cyber operations against Chinese infrastructure
Public designation of cable sabotage as "armed attack" triggering Taiwan Relations Act obligations

State Department proposes:

International investigation through UN or specialized agency
Coalition statement condemning infrastructure attacks
New international legal framework for cable protection

Industry proposes:

Expedited satellite communication deployment
Redundant cable routes avoiding Chinese-controlled waters
Screening Chinese firms from cable repair/manufacturing roles

Taiwan urges strong response, warning that cable attacks are "testing" for broader infrastructure campaign or blockade.

Inject 5: Collateral Damage

The cable damage has global ripple effects:

Internet latency increases across Asia-Pacific region
Some cryptocurrency trading platforms experience disruptions
Cloud services routing through Taiwan face degraded performance
Several Southeast Asian countries experience partial outages

Countries with Chinese cable investments (Pakistan, Myanmar, several African nations) experience no disruptions, raising questions about whether they would be targeted or leverage.

Decision Required:

Public attribution and messaging strategy
Military, diplomatic, and economic response measures
Protection for cable repair operations and future infrastructure
Long-term cable security strategy
Deterrence strategy for future infrastructure attacks

Key Questions:

How do you respond to infrastructure attacks that fall below traditional "armed attack" threshold?
Should the U.S. establish "red lines" for critical infrastructure attacks?
How do you build resilient communications that cannot be disrupted by cable sabotage?
What is appropriate retaliation: cyber operations against Chinese infrastructure, economic sanctions, military posturing?

Phase 4: Debrief (Minutes 70-90)

Discussion Questions:

Infrastructure Vulnerability: Why are submarine cables such attractive targets? What makes defending them difficult?
Attribution Challenge: How did uncertainty about who caused damage affect response options? What evidence would be sufficient for strong response?
Escalation Control: How do you respond forcefully without triggering military escalation or cyber warfare spiral?
Gray Zone Conflict: Infrastructure sabotage sits between peace and war. What frameworks should govern responses?
Resilience vs. Deterrence: Should strategy emphasize deterring attacks (threats of retaliation) or building resilience (redundancy, diversity)?
International Cooperation: How can international law and norms better protect critical infrastructure?
Second-Order Effects:
- Impact on Taiwan's economic viability and security
- Precedent for infrastructure attacks in future conflicts
- Global internet fragmentation and balkanization risks
- Private sector role in critical infrastructure protection

Background Materials

Key Authorities:

Taiwan Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act
Communications Act authorities (FCC)
Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and cyber operations

Infrastructure Data:

95%+ of intercontinental data travels via submarine cables
~500 submarine cables globally, carrying ~$10 trillion in financial transactions daily
Taiwan connected by multiple cables (majority land in northern Taiwan)
Average cable repair time: 2-6 weeks
Cable routes: Concentration in South China Sea, vulnerable chokepoints

Precedents:

2006, 2008 cable cuts disrupted Middle East/Asia internet (causes unclear)
2013 Egyptian divers arrested attempting cable sabotage
2022 Svalbard cable damage (suspected Russian activity)
Russia mapping NATO cables in North Atlantic

Facilitator Notes

Setup:

Show map of Asia-Pacific submarine cables
Provide brief on cable technology and repair process
Explain attribution challenges in underwater sabotage

Time Management:

Phase 1: Focus on immediate crisis response
Phase 2: Emphasize attribution uncertainty
Phase 3: Force decisions on escalation and deterrence
Phase 4: Extract lessons on infrastructure protection

Common Pitfalls:

Assuming quick/easy attribution (underwater sabotage very difficult to attribute)
Escalating to military confrontation without considering intermediate options
Ignoring resilience/redundancy in favor of retaliation only
Neglecting private sector role (most cables privately owned)

Learning Outcomes

Analyze critical infrastructure vulnerabilities in networked digital systems
Navigate attribution challenges when evidence is limited or ambiguous
Balance deterrence and resilience in infrastructure protection strategy
Understand gray-zone conflict tactics below armed conflict threshold
Coordinate government and private sector for critical infrastructure security

Tabletop Exercise: Tariff Escalation and Trade War Dynamics

Chapter: 6 - Trade Controls and Tariffs

Duration: 60-90 minutes

Learning Objectives:

Analyze escalation dynamics in trade conflicts
Evaluate effectiveness of tariffs as coercive tools
Understand domestic political economy of trade protection
Assess WTO constraints and workarounds in trade disputes

Scenario Overview

Date: January 2028

The United States announces sweeping new tariffs on Chinese imports under Section 301, citing unfair trade practices, forced technology transfer, and industrial subsidies. The measures include:

60% tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and batteries
40% tariffs on solar panels and wind turbines
25% tariffs on advanced manufactured goods (semiconductors, machinery, aerospace components)

China retaliates within 48 hours with:

50% tariffs on U.S. agricultural products (soybeans, pork, wheat)
40% tariffs on U.S. aircraft (targeting Boeing)
30% tariffs on U.S. energy exports (LNG, crude oil)
Initiation of anti-dumping and anti-monopoly investigations against U.S. firms

Both sides frame their actions as defensive responses to the other's unfair practices. Global markets react with volatility. U.S. allies express concern about being caught in the crossfire.

You are convened as the Trade Policy Review Group to assess the situation and develop next steps as the trade war threatens to spiral.

Participant Roles

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)

Responsibilities: Trade negotiations, tariff policy, WTO disputes
Interests: Achieving concessions from China, protecting U.S. industries
Constraints: WTO rules, congressional oversight, industry pressure

Deputy Secretary of Agriculture

Responsibilities: Agricultural exports, farmer interests
Interests: Protecting farmers from Chinese retaliation
Constraints: Farm state political pressure, limited subsidy funds

Deputy Secretary of Commerce

Responsibilities: Industrial competitiveness, manufacturing sector
Interests: Protecting U.S. manufacturers from Chinese competition
Constraints: Supply chain dependencies, export industry concerns

Deputy Secretary of Treasury

Responsibilities: Economic impact assessment, currency policy
Interests: Financial stability, preventing recession
Constraints: Tariffs increase costs, inflation concerns

Deputy National Security Advisor

Responsibilities: Coordinate security and economic policy
Interests: Weakening Chinese strategic industries
Constraints: Risk of economic decoupling, allied coordination needs

Business Roundtable Representative

Responsibilities: Represent U.S. corporate interests
Interests: Market access, supply chain stability
Constraints: Shareholder pressure, competitiveness concerns

Timeline and Injects

Phase 1: Initial Retaliation (Minutes 0-20)

Inject 1: Economic Impact

Within one week:

U.S. farmers face collapse in soybean prices ($2 billion in losses projected)
Boeing announces potential layoffs (China cancels $20 billion in aircraft orders)
U.S. automakers report disruption (dependent on Chinese battery components)
Consumer prices increase for electronics, appliances, household goods
Stock market drops 8% on recession fears

Chinese state media declares "trade war brings pain to both sides, but China can endure longer."

Key Questions:

Should the U.S. escalate with additional tariffs, hold position, or seek de-escalation?
How do you compensate domestic constituencies (farmers, manufacturers) hurt by retaliation?
What are realistic objectives: forced Chinese concessions, reduced bilateral trade dependence, or symbolic demonstration of resolve?

Phase 2: Allied Pressure and Third-Party Effects (Minutes 20-45)

Inject 2: Allied Concerns

EU: Complains U.S. tariffs violate WTO rules; threatens counter-tariffs if U.S. doesn't exempt European goods
Japan/South Korea: Warn that their firms caught in supply chain crossfire will be disadvantaged versus Chinese competitors
ASEAN countries: Fear becoming pressure points as both U.S. and China seek alternative trade routes through Southeast Asia
Taiwan: Concerned that U.S.-China trade war reduces Taiwanese leverage and economic importance

Inject 3: Chinese Economic Warfare

Beyond tariffs, China implements:

Informal import bans on U.S. goods (customs delays, regulatory harassment)
Investigations and fines against U.S. companies operating in China (Apple, Tesla, Microsoft face "anti-monopoly" actions)
"Unreliable Entity List" designating U.S. firms for restrictions
Encouragement of consumer boycotts against U.S. brands

Key Questions:

How do you coordinate with allies to create united front versus allowing each country to cut separate deals with China?
Should U.S. respond to Chinese non-tariff barriers with its own informal restrictions?
What is the appropriate forum: bilateral negotiations, WTO dispute settlement, or plurilateral coalition?

Phase 3: Escalation or De-escalation (Minutes 45-70)

Inject 4: Domestic Political Pressure

Farm state senators: Demand emergency agricultural subsidies and threaten to block administration priorities
Manufacturing CEOs: Split between those benefiting from protection and those hurt by supply chain disruptions
Consumer groups: Protest rising prices and inflation
Labor unions: Support tariffs on Chinese goods but oppose automation that tariffs might accelerate
Congressional leadership: Demands trade deal before midterm elections

Inject 5: Chinese Offer

Through back channels, China signals willingness to negotiate if:

U.S. removes Section 301 tariffs
U.S. ends semiconductor export controls
U.S. stops arms sales to Taiwan

Short of these demands, China offers modest concessions:

Increased purchases of U.S. agricultural products ($20 billion annually)
Slight reduction in Chinese tariffs (from 50% to 30% on some goods)
Vague commitments on intellectual property protection

Decision Required:

Next steps in tariff policy (escalate, hold, or reduce)
Compensation programs for affected U.S. industries
Allied coordination strategy
Negotiation approach with China
Long-term trade policy toward China (managed decoupling, phase agreement, or full normalization)

Key Questions:

Are tariffs achieving stated objectives (changing Chinese behavior, protecting U.S. industry)?
How much economic pain is acceptable to achieve trade policy goals?
What would constitute a "win" that justifies declaring success and de-escalating?

Phase 4: Debrief (Minutes 70-90)

Discussion Questions:

Effectiveness: Did tariffs effectively coerce China or primarily impose mutual costs?
Escalation Dynamics: What drove escalation? Could spiral have been prevented?
Domestic Politics: How did interest group politics shape trade policy options?
Allied Coordination: Why is unified Western trade policy difficult to achieve?
Alternatives: Could negotiation, multilateral pressure, or targeted sectoral approaches achieve better outcomes?
Long-term Impacts: Effects on U.S.-China economic relationship, global trade system, WTO legitimacy?

Background Materials

Authorities:

Section 301 of Trade Act of 1974
Section 232 (national security tariffs)
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)

Data:

U.S.-China trade: $700 billion annually
U.S. agricultural exports to China: $20-30 billion
Tariff revenue vs. economic costs
Historical trade war precedents (Smoot-Hawley, 1930s)

Precedents:

2018-2020 U.S.-China trade war
Phase One trade agreement (2020)
Trump/Biden tariff policies

Learning Outcomes

Analyze escalation dynamics in trade conflicts
Evaluate tariff effectiveness as coercive tool
Navigate domestic political economy of trade policy
Understand limitations of unilateral trade measures

Tabletop Exercise: Designing a Comprehensive Financial Sanctions Regime

Chapter: 7 - Financial Statecraft and Sanctions

Duration: 60-90 minutes

Learning Objectives:

Design effective financial sanctions packages balancing leverage and costs
Evaluate trade-offs between comprehensive sanctions and targeted measures
Understand challenges of sanctions enforcement and evasion
Assess de-dollarization risks from aggressive sanctions use

Scenario Overview

Date: April 2028

The military junta in Myanmar, which has ruled since the 2021 coup, intensifies its brutal crackdown on pro-democracy protesters, ethnic minorities, and civil society. Reports document:

Mass killings of civilians by security forces
Widespread use of torture and arbitrary detention
Forced displacement of 500,000+ Rohingya and ethnic minorities
Blocking humanitarian aid access to conflict zones
Attacks on schools, hospitals, and religious sites

International outrage grows following leaked videos of atrocities. Congress passes bipartisan legislation demanding the Administration impose "comprehensive sanctions" on Myanmar's military regime. Regional allies (India, Thailand, Japan) express concern about refugee flows and regional instability but are reluctant to isolate Myanmar, which could drive it deeper into Chinese orbit.

You are convened as the Sanctions Policy Coordination Committee to design a financial sanctions package that maximizes pressure on the junta while managing humanitarian, economic, and geopolitical complications.

Participant Roles

Deputy Secretary of Treasury

Responsibilities: OFAC sanctions, financial system stability
Interests: Effective pressure on junta, protecting dollar system integrity
Constraints: De-dollarization concerns, enforcement challenges

Deputy Secretary of State

Responsibilities: Diplomatic pressure, humanitarian concerns, regional stability
Interests: Supporting democracy, protecting civilians, allied coordination
Constraints: Regional allies resistant to sanctions, Chinese influence

Deputy National Security Advisor

Responsibilities: Balancing competing interests, strategic objectives
Interests: Preventing Chinese domination of Myanmar, promoting democratic norms
Constraints: Limited leverage over military junta, regional complexity

USAID Administrator

Responsibilities: Humanitarian assistance, development programs
Interests: Maintaining access to vulnerable populations
Constraints: Sanctions can block humanitarian aid flows

NSC Director for Asia

Responsibilities: Regional strategy, managing China factor
Interests: Preventing Myanmar becoming Chinese client state
Constraints: Sanctions may push junta toward Beijing

NGO Human Rights Advocate

Responsibilities: Represent civil society and democracy activists
Interests: Maximum pressure on junta, accountability for atrocities
Constraints: No formal authority, limited information

Timeline and Injects

Phase 1: Sanctions Design (Minutes 0-20)

Inject 1: Sanctions Menu

Treasury presents options:

Comprehensive/Country-Level: Block all financial transactions with Myanmar (similar to North Korea/Iran)
Sectoral: Target specific industries (natural gas, jade, gemstones generating junta revenue)
Targeted/Individual: Sanction specific junta leaders, military units, businesses
Financial Institution: Block Myanmar banks from dollar system, SWIFT access
Secondary: Sanction third parties doing business with Myanmar junta

For each option, assessment provided:

Estimated impact on junta revenue and behavior
Humanitarian costs (blocking food, medicine, banking for civilians)
Enforcement challenges (evasion through China, Thailand)
Allied coordination needs
De-dollarization risks (driving countries toward alternative payment systems)

Key Questions:

What is the primary objective: compel junta to negotiate power transfer, punish atrocities, or degrade military capabilities?
How do you maximize pressure on junta while minimizing humanitarian harm to civilian population?
Which sanctions approach (comprehensive, sectoral, targeted) best balances effectiveness and costs?

Phase 2: Enforcement and Evasion (Minutes 20-45)

Inject 2: Evasion Routes

Intelligence reveals:

China: Providing financial lifeline through yuan-denominated trade, alternative payment systems (CIPS)
Thailand: Thai banks facilitating transactions despite U.S. pressure; cross-border informal finance
Singapore: Shell companies obscuring beneficial ownership of Myanmar businesses
Cryptocurrency: Junta leaders using crypto to move funds and evade detection
Hawala networks: Informal value transfer systems bypassing formal banking

Enforcement challenges:

Limited Treasury/DoJ resources to investigate complex evasion schemes
Difficulty distinguishing legitimate humanitarian transactions from sanctions violations
Third-country resistance to enforcing U.S. sanctions

Inject 3: Humanitarian Impact

USAID and NGOs report sanctions side effects:

Banks refusing all Myanmar transactions due to over-compliance (de-risking)
Humanitarian organizations cannot pay staff or purchase supplies
Remittances from migrant workers (critical for families) blocked
Medical supply imports disrupted
Food prices spiking due to import financing difficulties

Democracy activists inside Myanmar send message: "We support sanctions on junta, but please don't starve the population."

Key Questions:

How do you design humanitarian exemptions that allow aid while preventing junta exploitation?
Should U.S. use secondary sanctions to compel third-party compliance, even if it damages relationships?
What enforcement resources and mechanisms are needed to make sanctions effective?

Phase 3: Strategic Trade-offs and Geopolitical Complications (Minutes 45-70)

Inject 4: Chinese Counter-Moves

China responds to U.S. sanctions by:

Increasing economic engagement with Myanmar ($10 billion investment package)
Offering Myanmar access to Chinese alternative payment systems
Proposing "Myanmar peace process" that would legitimize junta while marginalizing democracy opposition
Using Myanmar as example in international fora of "U.S. unilateral coercion" and why countries need alternatives to dollar system

Inject 5: Regional Allies Pushback

India: Concerned about Chinese influence; quietly engaging with junta; opposes sanctions that empower Beijing
Thailand: Hosts 100,000 Myanmar refugees; fears sanctions will increase flows; resists enforcement cooperation
Japan: Supports democracy rhetorically but has business interests in Myanmar; prefers engagement to sanctions
ASEAN: Divided; some members support sanctions, others prioritize non-interference principle

Allies request U.S. provide:

Funding for refugee support if sanctions increase displacement
Alternative economic engagement plans if they comply with sanctions
Coordination on "carrots" for junta (sanctions relief conditions)

Decision Required: Final sanctions package including:

Scope (comprehensive, sectoral, or targeted)
Humanitarian exemption mechanisms
Secondary sanctions on third parties
Enforcement strategy and resources
Allied coordination and burden-sharing
Conditionality (clear criteria for sanctions relief)
Accompanying diplomatic and economic measures

Key Questions:

How do you prevent sanctions from driving Myanmar further into Chinese sphere?
Are sanctions sustainable if regional allies don't cooperate and China provides alternatives?
What combination of pressure (sanctions) and incentives (sanctions relief, aid) creates path to resolution?
How do you manage risk that aggressive sanctions use accelerates global de-dollarization?

Phase 4: Debrief (Minutes 70-90)

Discussion Questions:

Effectiveness: Can financial sanctions compel behavior change by determined autocratic regime?
Humanitarian Balance: How did you navigate tension between pressure and humanitarian protection?
Enforcement: What makes sanctions enforceable versus easily evaded?
Allied Coordination: Why is multilateral cooperation difficult even when allies share values?
Unintended Consequences: De-dollarization, Chinese influence, civilian suffering, NGO de-banking
Long-term Strategy: Exit strategy? Conditions for lifting sanctions? How to avoid permanent isolation?

Background Materials

Authorities:

International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA)

Data:

Myanmar military revenue sources (natural gas, gems, timber, banking)
Humanitarian needs and aid flows
Regional trade patterns and Chinese investment
Previous sanctions effectiveness cases

Precedents:

Iran comprehensive sanctions
Russia sectoral sanctions (2014, 2022)
North Korea sanctions
Venezuela targeted sanctions

Learning Outcomes

Design sanctions packages balancing objectives and constraints
Navigate humanitarian exemptions and over-compliance
Assess multilateral coordination challenges
Understand long-term risks of financial sanctions overuse

Tabletop Exercise: CFIUS Review and Investment Screening Dilemmas

Chapter: 8 - Investment Screening, Industrial Policy, and Strategic Assets

Duration: 60-90 minutes

Learning Objectives:

Apply CFIUS framework to assess national security risks of foreign investments
Evaluate trade-offs between security and economic openness
Understand sectoral and technology-based investment risks
Navigate political pressure and interagency disagreement in investment screening

Scenario Overview

Date: July 2028

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) faces three simultaneous high-profile cases requiring urgent decisions. Each involves Chinese investment in U.S. companies with potential national security implications but also significant economic consequences:

Case 1: Chinese semiconductor equipment firm seeks to acquire 40% stake in U.S. precision machinery company that supplies components used in advanced chip manufacturing

Case 2: Chinese private equity fund (with state-owned enterprise investors) proposes $2 billion investment in U.S. agricultural biotechnology company developing gene-editing technology

Case 3: Chinese electric vehicle battery company wants to build $5 billion manufacturing facility in Michigan, creating 2,000 jobs in economically distressed region

All three transactions have been voluntarily filed with CFIUS. You must decide: approve, approve with mitigation measures, or block each transaction. Congressional and industry pressure is intense. Presidential decision required within 30 days.

Participant Roles

CFIUS Chair (Deputy Secretary of Treasury)

Responsibilities: Lead CFIUS process, synthesize recommendations
Interests: Balancing security and economic openness
Constraints: Statutory timelines, appeals process

Deputy Secretary of Defense Representative

Responsibilities: Assess defense industrial base risks
Interests: Protecting military technology and capabilities
Constraints: Many civilian technologies have military applications

Deputy Secretary of Commerce Representative

Responsibilities: Economic competitiveness, industrial base
Interests: Maintaining U.S. technological leadership
Constraints: Need for foreign investment capital

Deputy Attorney General (DOJ Representative)

Responsibilities: Law enforcement and security concerns
Interests: Preventing espionage and technology theft
Constraints: Legal standards of evidence

ODNI Representative

Responsibilities: Intelligence assessment of foreign government connections
Interests: Protecting against intelligence collection
Constraints: Limited visibility into Chinese corporate structures

State Department Representative

Responsibilities: Diplomatic implications
Interests: Managing U.S.-China relations
Constraints: Blocking deals creates diplomatic friction

Timeline and Injects

Phase 1: Case 1 - Semiconductor Equipment (Minutes 0-25)

Inject 1: Transaction Details

Chinese firm "TechPrecision Industries" offers $800 million for 40% stake in "AmeriMachine Inc." (based in California, 500 employees). AmeriMachine produces ultra-precision CNC machines used in semiconductor manufacturing equipment.

Due Diligence Findings:

TechPrecision has contracts with Chinese government entities
AmeriMachine technology is dual-use (also used in aerospace, defense)
Several AmeriMachine executives are former DOD contractors
Chinese investors would gain board seats and access to R&D
No direct U.S. government contracts, but supplies companies that have them

Intelligence Assessment:

TechPrecision likely has ties to Chinese military-civil fusion programs
Technology could enhance Chinese semiconductor manufacturing capabilities
Risk of technology diversion to Chinese military applications

Economic Impact:

AmeriMachine struggling financially; needs capital injection
Alternative investors (U.S., EU, Japan) offering less money with more conditions
500 jobs at risk if company cannot secure financing

Industry Position:

U.S. semiconductor firms oppose (fear strengthening Chinese capabilities)
Some equipment manufacturers support (want access to Chinese market)

Key Questions:

Does this transaction present unacceptable national security risk?
Are mitigation measures (e.g., board restrictions, technology access limits, compliance monitoring) sufficient?
How do you balance AmeriMachine's financial needs against technology protection?

Phase 2: Case 2 - Agricultural Biotechnology (Minutes 25-50)

Inject 2: Transaction Details

Chinese private equity fund "Golden Harvest Capital" proposes $2 billion investment in "GenAg Sciences" (based in Iowa), acquiring 35% stake. GenAg develops CRISPR gene-editing technology for crop improvement.

Due Diligence Findings:

Golden Harvest's largest investors include Chinese state-owned enterprises
GenAg technology has applications for food security (China's concern)
Technology could enhance biological research capabilities
GenAg holds sensitive genomic data from U.S. agricultural regions
Chinese investors request rights to license technology in Asia

Intelligence Assessment:

China prioritizes agricultural biotechnology for food security
Potential dual-use for biological weapons research (low probability but catastrophic impact)
Concern about Chinese access to U.S. genomic and agricultural data
China's military-civil fusion could redirect civilian technology

Economic Impact:

GenAg needs capital for R&D and commercialization
Investment would accelerate development of drought-resistant crops (beneficial globally)
Iowa governor and Congressional delegation strongly support (jobs, rural development)
U.S. agricultural sector split (some fear Chinese biotech dominance)

Political Pressure:

Senator from Iowa threatens to block administration nominees if deal blocked
Bioethics community concerned about genomic data transfers
Farm lobby supports investment as opening Chinese market access

Key Questions:

How do you assess dual-use risks of biotechnology versus traditional defense technology?
Should genomic data and agricultural IP be treated as national security assets?
Are concerns about Chinese food security motivations legitimate or cover for military applications?

Phase 3: Case 3 - EV Battery Manufacturing (Minutes 50-75)

Inject 3: Transaction Details

"ChargeTech Industries" (Chinese battery manufacturer) proposes $5 billion greenfield investment building EV battery gigafactory in Detroit area. No U.S. company acquisition; purely new facility construction.

Due Diligence Findings:

ChargeTech is private company but receives Chinese government subsidies
Facility would produce batteries for U.S. automakers (Tesla, Ford, GM)
Technology involves proprietary Chinese battery chemistry and manufacturing processes
Plant would employ 2,000 workers in economically distressed region
Chinese firm requests access to U.S. grid infrastructure and rare earth supply chains

Intelligence Assessment:

Minimal direct national security risk (consumer EV batteries)
Potential supply chain dependencies if future U.S. automakers rely on Chinese supplier
Facility could collect data on U.S. energy infrastructure and logistics
China could use facility as leverage in future crises (threaten shutdown)

Economic Impact:

Massive economic benefit to Detroit region ($5 billion investment, 2,000 direct jobs, 5,000+ indirect)
Accelerates U.S. EV transition (climate benefits)
Reduces need to import Chinese batteries
But creates dependency on Chinese firm for critical U.S. industry

Political Pressure:

Michigan governor and Congressional delegation demand approval
Labor unions support (jobs)
Environmental groups support (EV transition)
Some manufacturing groups oppose (subsidized Chinese competition)
Energy Department concerned about grid infrastructure access

Key Questions:

Does greenfield investment (new facility, not acquisition) present different security risks?
How do you weigh job creation and climate benefits against supply chain dependency risks?
Can mitigation measures (e.g., restricting infrastructure access, requiring U.S. sourcing) address concerns?

Phase 4: Synthesis and Recommendations (Minutes 75-90)

Decision Required: For each case, recommend:

Approve
Approve with mitigation measures (specify)
Block/divest

Discussion Questions:

Risk Assessment Framework: How did you distinguish acceptable from unacceptable national security risks across different sectors?
Mitigation Effectiveness: When are mitigation measures sufficient versus inadequate? How enforceable are they?
Economic Trade-offs: How did you balance security risks against economic benefits (jobs, capital, innovation)?
Political Pressure: How did you handle Congressional and state-level pressure? Should CFIUS be insulated from politics?
Consistency: Were your decisions consistent across the three cases? What principles guided trade-offs?
Sectoral Differences: Should some sectors (semiconductors, biotech, energy) receive different scrutiny levels?
Alternatives to Blocking:
- Could U.S. provide alternative financing to reduce Chinese investment need?
- Are there coalition investment models (allies pool capital) to replace Chinese investors?
Long-term Strategy: Impact on U.S. as investment destination? Will aggressive screening drive capital elsewhere?

Background Materials

Key Authorities:

Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), 2018
CFIUS regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 800
Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) for technology controls

CFIUS Process:

Voluntary and mandatory filings
45-day review + 45-day investigation
Presidential authority to block/divest (rarely used)
Mitigation agreements for approved deals

Recent Cases:

Broadcom/Qualcomm (2018): Blocked
Grindr/Kunlun (2020): Forced divestment
Multiple Chinese tech company acquisitions blocked (2018-2024)

Data:

Chinese FDI in U.S.: Peaked at $46 billion (2016), declined to <$5 billion (2023) following CFIUS expansion
CFIUS filings: 200-300 annually, ~10-15% involve Chinese parties

Learning Outcomes

Apply CFIUS framework to assess national security risks
Evaluate sector-specific investment vulnerabilities
Design mitigation measures for approved transactions
Balance competing interests (security, economy, politics)
Understand investment screening's role in broader economic security strategy

Tabletop Exercise: Applying Historical Lessons to Contemporary Challenges

Chapter: 9 - Historical and Comparative Cases

Duration: 60-90 minutes

Learning Objectives:

Extract generalizable lessons from historical sanctions cases
Compare effectiveness factors across different eras and contexts
Apply historical frameworks to contemporary policy challenges
Understand limitations of historical analogies

Scenario Overview

Date: May 2028

Following a military coup in a strategically located country (fictional "Meridiana"), the National Security Council must design a coercive economic strategy. You are tasked with applying lessons from three historical cases to inform your recommendations:

CoCom (1949-1994): Multilateral technology denial against Soviet bloc
South African Apartheid Sanctions (1960s-1994): Comprehensive sanctions contributing to regime change
Cuba Embargo (1960-present): Long-running unilateral sanctions with limited effectiveness

Current Crisis: Meridiana's military has overthrown democratically elected government, arrested opposition leaders, and declared martial law. The country sits at a critical geographic chokepoint for energy transit and hosts significant rare earth deposits. Both China and Russia have economic interests in Meridiana and are offering financial support to the junta.

Participant Roles

Deputy Secretary of State (Historical Case 1: CoCom Expert)

Assigned to present CoCom lessons: multilateral coordination, technology denial effectiveness, allied burden-sharing

Deputy Secretary of Treasury (Historical Case 2: South Africa Expert)

Assigned to present South Africa lessons: comprehensive sanctions, corporate divestment, role of domestic opposition

Deputy National Security Advisor (Historical Case 3: Cuba Expert)

Assigned to present Cuba lessons: unilateral sanctions limitations, regime resilience, humanitarian costs

Policy Planning Staff Director

Synthesize lessons across cases and identify relevant applications

Intelligence Officer

Provide current intelligence on Meridiana situation

Academic Historian (External Advisor)

Challenge assumptions and highlight where historical analogies may mislead

Timeline and Injects

Phase 1: Historical Case Presentations (Minutes 0-30)

Inject 1: CoCom Case (10 minutes)

Presenter covers:

Structure: NATO allies plus Japan coordinated export controls on strategic technologies to Soviet bloc
Effectiveness: Successfully degraded Soviet military-industrial capabilities; forced costly indigenous development
Keys to success: (1) Allied unity based on shared Soviet threat, (2) Clear technology lists, (3) Long time horizon (40+ years), (4) Soviet relative economic isolation
Limitations: Required constant diplomatic maintenance; allies cheated; Soviet eventually developed alternatives

Lessons for Meridiana:

Multilateral cooperation multiplies effectiveness but is hard to achieve/sustain
Technology denial works if target cannot easily substitute
Requires long-term commitment measured in decades, not years

Inject 2: South Africa Apartheid Sanctions (10 minutes)

Presenter covers:

Evolution: Gradual escalation from arms embargo (1960s/70s) to comprehensive sanctions (1980s)
Mechanisms: UN sanctions, corporate divestment, capital flight, cultural/sports boycotts, oil embargo
Effectiveness: Contributed to regime change (1994) but not sole factor; domestic resistance critical
Keys to success: (1) Global moral consensus against apartheid, (2) South African business community support for change, (3) Internal resistance (ANC, labor), (4) Security deterioration
Limitations: Sanctions alone insufficient; required combination with internal pressure

Lessons for Meridiana:

Comprehensive sanctions can work but require moral legitimacy and internal opposition partners
Corporate and financial sector pressure can be powerful
Humanitarian costs of comprehensive sanctions are significant
Multilateral legitimacy (UN) matters

Inject 3: Cuba Embargo (10 minutes)

Presenter covers:

Structure: U.S. unilateral comprehensive embargo (1960-present)
Objectives: Initially regime change; later deterrence of Latin American communism; eventually normalized as policy inertia
Effectiveness: Failed to achieve regime change despite 60+ years; regime adapted and survived
Why it failed: (1) Unilateral (other countries traded with Cuba), (2) Soviet support until 1991, (3) Regime maintained domestic control, (4) Nationalism ("resistance to imperialism") legitimized regime
Costs: Humanitarian suffering; U.S. isolation in hemisphere; entrenched Castro regime

Lessons for Meridiana:

Unilateral sanctions against regime with external support rarely succeed
Long-term sanctions can entrench target regime and rally nationalist support
Clear exit criteria essential to avoid policy inertia
Humanitarian exemptions critical

Phase 2: Analyzing Meridiana (Minutes 30-55)

Inject 4: Current Intelligence Assessment

Meridiana Profile:

Population: 30 million
Economy: Middle-income, dependent on energy transit fees and rare earth exports
Government: Military junta following coup; popular protests suppressed
External support: China offering $5 billion loan; Russia providing military equipment
Opposition: Fragmented; democratic forces arrested; limited organized resistance
Humanitarian: Food/medicine imports needed; drought threatening famine
Allies: Regional neighbors divided; some support junta (fear instability), others support democracy

U.S. Interests:

Energy security (30% of Asian LNG transits through Meridiana straits)
Rare earth access (Meridiana has 20% of global deposits)
Democratic norms and credibility
Preventing Chinese/Russian sphere of influence expansion

Constraints:

Limited U.S. trade with Meridiana ($2 billion annually)
European allies dependent on energy transit
China and Russia willing to provide economic lifeline
Regional allies fear refugee flows if sanctions cause collapse

Key Questions:

Which historical case is most analogous to Meridiana? Why?
What contextual differences make historical lessons less applicable?
Which success factors from historical cases are present/absent in Meridiana?

Phase 3: Strategy Design (Minutes 55-80)

Inject 5: Policy Options

Participants must design sanctions strategy addressing:

Objectives Clarity:

What is achievable goal: regime change, policy change, containment, or signaling?
What would constitute success allowing sanctions to be lifted?

Sanctions Scope:

Comprehensive (all trade/finance) or targeted (specific sectors/individuals)?
Unilateral U.S. or multilateral coalition?
Which sectors to target: energy transit, rare earths, banking, military?

Allied Coordination:

How to secure European participation despite energy dependencies?
What incentives/burden-sharing needed?
UN sanctions (unlikely given Chinese/Russian veto) or coalition of willing?

Timeline and Sustainability:

Short-term pressure (months) or long-term strategy (years/decades)?
How to sustain domestic and allied support over time?

Combination with Other Tools:

Support for internal opposition (lessons from South Africa)?
Diplomatic isolation and legitimacy-building?
Humanitarian exemptions and monitoring?

Exit Strategy:

What junta actions trigger sanctions relief?
How to avoid Cuba scenario of perpetual sanctions?

Key Questions:

Based on historical lessons, which approach has best chance of success?
How do you adapt historical lessons to different contemporary context?
What are realistic objectives given Meridiana's external support and U.S. limited leverage?

Phase 4: Debrief and Meta-Analysis (Minutes 80-90)

Discussion Questions:

Analogy Limits: When are historical analogies helpful versus misleading? What makes Meridiana different from CoCom-era Soviet Union, apartheid South Africa, or Castro's Cuba?
Success Factors: Across historical cases, what factors correlate with sanctions effectiveness:
- Multilateral coordination?
- Target isolation vs. external support?
- Internal opposition strength?
- Moral legitimacy?
- Time horizon?
- Economic integration level?
Failure Patterns: Why do sanctions fail:
- Circumvention by third parties?
- Target regime resilience?
- Humanitarian costs undermining support?
- Policy inertia replacing strategic logic?
Contemporary Differences: How does 21st century globalization, digital connectivity, and Chinese alternative financing change sanctions effectiveness compared to Cold War era?
Learning Correctly: What biases affect historical lesson-drawing:
- Selection bias (studying successful cases, ignoring failures)?
- Overgeneralization (assuming one context applies to all)?
- Recency bias (overweighting recent cases)?
Policy Implications: Should U.S. rely less on economic coercion given historical mixed record? Or can design improvements increase effectiveness?

Background Materials

Historical Cases:

Mastanduno, Michael. "Economic Containment: CoCom and the Politics of East-West Trade." Cornell UP, 1992
Crawford, Neta C., and Audie Klotz. "How Sanctions Work: South Africa." St. Martin's Press, 1999
Perez, Louis A. "Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy." Georgia UP, 2003

Sanctions Effectiveness Studies:

Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, et al. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered." PIIE, 2007 (estimates ~20-30% success rate)
Pape, Robert A. "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work." International Security, 1997
Drezner, Daniel W. "The Sanctions Paradox." Cambridge UP, 1999

Data:

Historical sanctions database (Peterson Institute)
UN sanctions tracking
Effectiveness factors correlations

Learning Outcomes

Extract lessons from diverse historical sanctions cases
Identify success and failure factors across different contexts
Apply historical frameworks while recognizing contextual limits
Avoid historical analogy pitfalls (overgeneralization, selection bias)
Synthesize lessons into actionable contemporary policy recommendations

Tabletop Exercise: Multi-Domain Crisis in 2030

Chapter: 10 - Future Scenarios and Policy Implications

Duration: 60-90 minutes

Learning Objectives:

Anticipate emerging forms of economic coercion using future technologies
Manage simultaneous crises across multiple domains (cyber, space, economic, climate)
Evaluate novel policy tools for 21st century geoeconomic competition
Assess systemic risks and cascade effects in interconnected global systems

Scenario Overview

Date: June 2030

The United States faces an unprecedented multi-domain crisis as tensions with China escalate across economic, technological, and environmental spheres. Unlike historical crises centered on single events or domains, this challenge involves simultaneous pressure across interconnected systems, creating cascading risks and novel policy dilemmas.

The crisis unfolds across five interrelated dimensions:

Climate: Extreme weather disrupts critical supply chains
Digital: Cyber attacks target economic infrastructure
Space: Anti-satellite weapons threaten GPS and communications
Financial: Digital currency warfare and payment system fragmentation
Biotech: Synthetic biology enabling new forms of coercion

You are convened as the Strategic Competition Policy Committee to manage escalating tensions and develop integrated response strategies for 21st century economic statecraft.

Participant Roles

Deputy National Security Advisor

Responsibilities: Coordinate across domains, manage escalation
Interests: Preventing conflict, protecting U.S. interests
Constraints: Novel threats exceed existing policy frameworks

Deputy Secretary of Treasury (Digital Currency Lead)

Responsibilities: Financial system stability, digital currency policy
Interests: Preserving dollar dominance, preventing financial system fragmentation
Constraints: Limited control over decentralized technologies

Deputy Secretary of Commerce (Technology Security Lead)

Responsibilities: Emerging technology controls, space commerce
Interests: U.S. technological leadership
Constraints: Rapid technology change outpaces regulatory frameworks

CISA Director (Infrastructure Lead)

Responsibilities: Critical infrastructure protection across cyber-physical systems
Interests: Resilience of interconnected systems
Constraints: Public-private sector coordination challenges

Space Force Representative

Responsibilities: Space domain awareness and security
Interests: Protecting critical space infrastructure
Constraints: Limited international norms for space conflict

Climate Envoy

Responsibilities: Climate policy, green technology supply chains
Interests: Climate transition while protecting security
Constraints: Climate cooperation needs compete with strategic rivalry

Timeline and Injects

Phase 1: Climate-Supply Chain Nexus (Minutes 0-20)

Inject 1: Green Technology Chokepoint

Catastrophic flooding in southern China (climate change-amplified typhoon) damages critical infrastructure for:

60% of global solar panel production (primarily Xinjiang region)
70% of rare earth processing facilities
Major EV battery component manufacturing

Global green energy transition suddenly faces 12-18 month delays. Prices for solar panels, batteries, and critical minerals spike 300-400%.

Chinese Response: China announces "Climate Emergency Resource Allocation System":

Prioritizes clean energy exports to "climate cooperation partners"
Countries supporting U.S. climate technology export controls to China face reduced access
Offers climate finance and technology access in exchange for diplomatic concessions on Taiwan, South China Sea

Complicated Dynamics:

U.S. needs Chinese green technology for climate targets
China uses climate emergency to gain geopolitical leverage
Global South countries caught between U.S. and Chinese climate offers

Key Questions:

Should climate cooperation be conditioned on Chinese political behavior, or are climate stakes too high?
How do you build alternative green technology supply chains when China dominates and climate timeline is urgent?
Can the U.S. use climate finance and technology sharing as counter-coercion tool?

Phase 2: Digital Currency Warfare (Minutes 20-40)

Inject 2: Payment System Fragmentation

China accelerates digital yuan internationalization following coordination with Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia:

BRICS+ Digital Currency Network: New payment system for 40+ countries (40% global GDP)
Commodity-backed settlement: Oil, gas, minerals priced in digital currency basket
Alternative to SWIFT: Real-time cross-border payments bypassing dollar system

Simultaneously:

Several countries announce plans to hold digital yuan reserves
China offers preferential trade financing for digital yuan users
Crypto-based payment systems gain traction for sanctions evasion

U.S. Financial System Impact:

Dollar's share of global reserves declines from 58% to 50% in six months
Treasury market volatility as foreign holdings decline
Reduced effectiveness of financial sanctions as alternatives proliferate

Fed and Treasury Assessment:

U.S. digital dollar 2+ years from implementation
Banning competing digital currencies likely drives them underground
Financial sanctions losing potency as alternative systems mature

Key Questions:

How do you respond to emerging payment system competition: accelerate U.S. digital dollar, restrict alternatives, or accept multipolar financial system?
Can financial sanctions remain effective when targets have viable alternatives?
Should U.S. prioritize preserving dollar dominance or gracefully manage transition to multipolar system?

Phase 3: Cyber-Physical Systems Attack (Minutes 40-60)

Inject 3: Infrastructure Cascade

A sophisticated cyber attack (attribution unclear but suspected Chinese origin) targets U.S. critical infrastructure:

Power Grid: Malware disrupts renewable energy systems (solar, wind) causing grid instability
Logistics: Port automation systems compromised; cargo routing chaos
Financial: Clearing systems for equities and derivatives experience delays
Telecommunications: 5G networks experience intermittent outages

Attack exploits vulnerabilities in:

Internet of Things (IoT) devices manufactured in China
Software supply chains with compromised open-source components
AI-powered infrastructure management systems

Cascading Effects:

Economic losses: $50 billion+ in first week
Public panic: Bank runs, hoarding behavior
Political pressure: Demands for retaliation

Attribution Challenge:

Attack routed through multiple countries
Malware includes code fragments from multiple sources
China denies involvement; suggests "criminal actors"
No definitive proof of state sponsorship

Key Questions:

How do you respond to catastrophic cyber attack without certain attribution?
What constitutes proportional cyber retaliation, and what escalation risks does it create?
How do you secure cyber-physical infrastructure when supply chains are globally interdependent?

Phase 4: Space and Biotech Dimensions (Minutes 60-80)

Inject 4: Anti-Satellite Demonstration

China conducts "debris removal test" using anti-satellite capability, destroying defunct satellite near U.S. GPS constellation. While technically targeting space junk, the demonstration:

Proves Chinese capability to disable U.S. space infrastructure
Creates debris field threatening commercial satellites
Sends message: "Your precision-guided weapons, financial systems, and communications depend on space assets we can threaten"

Simultaneously, Chinese space station begins commercial operations offering:

Manufacturing in zero-gravity (advanced materials)
Earth observation services competing with U.S. commercial satellites
Space-based solar power research (potential energy revolution)

Inject 5: Synthetic Biology Leverage

Intelligence reveals Chinese biotech advances:

CRISPR-based agricultural technology creating drought/pest-resistant crops
Synthetic biology for rare molecule production (pharmaceutical precursors, industrial chemicals)
Genetic database containing genomic information on billions of individuals

China offers:

Agricultural technology to climate-vulnerable countries (creating dependencies)
Pharmaceutical precursor access based on political alignment
Genomic research collaboration (with data sharing requirements)

Strategic Implications:

Biotech creates novel forms of leverage (food security, medicine access, genetic information)
Space denial capabilities threaten entire infrastructure domains
U.S. lacks comparable biotech leverage or space resilience

Decision Required: Integrated strategy addressing:

Immediate crisis management: Cyber response, infrastructure resilience, market stabilization
Domain-specific strategies: Climate/green tech, digital currency, cyber security, space, biotech
Cross-cutting approaches: Supply chain resilience, technology controls, allied coordination
Escalation management: Preventing crisis spiral across multiple domains simultaneously
Long-term adaptation: How to compete in multi-domain strategic environment

Key Questions:

How do you prioritize when crises span multiple domains simultaneously?
What new policy tools are needed for emerging technologies (digital currency, synthetic biology, space commerce)?
How do you build resilience against novel coercion forms you haven't encountered before?
Can traditional frameworks (sanctions, export controls) adapt to decentralized, rapidly evolving technologies?

Phase 5: Debrief and Future Policy (Minutes 80-90)

Discussion Questions:

Multi-Domain Complexity: How did simultaneous crises across domains complicate decision-making? What coordination mechanisms are needed?
Novel Coercion Forms: Which emerging technologies (digital currency, synthetic biology, space, AI, quantum) create new coercion opportunities? How do you defend against threats you've never faced?
Interconnection Vulnerabilities: How do cascading effects across interconnected systems (cyber-physical, climate-economic, space-terrestrial) create systemic risks?
Policy Tool Adequacy: Are existing tools (sanctions, export controls, investment screening) sufficient for future competition? What new authorities or capabilities are needed?
Resilience vs. Leverage: Should strategy emphasize building resilience (reducing dependencies) or developing counter-leverage (new chokepoints)?
Cooperation vs. Competition: In domains requiring cooperation (climate, pandemics, space debris), how do you cooperate with strategic competitors?
Scenario Planning: What other future scenarios should policymakers prepare for:
- Quantum computing breaking encryption
- Artificial general intelligence (AGI) breakthroughs
- Climate tipping points forcing cooperation
- Global economic decoupling into blocs
- Proliferation of autonomous weapons
Adaptation Strategy: How should U.S. policy evolve to address 2030s challenges:
- Institutional reforms (new agencies, authorities)?
- Allied coordination mechanisms?
- Public-private partnerships?
- Technology investment and development?
- Education and workforce development?

Background Materials

Emerging Technologies:

Digital currencies (CBDCs, cryptocurrencies, stablecoins)
Synthetic biology and CRISPR gene editing
Quantum computing and communications
Artificial intelligence and machine learning
Space commerce and cislunar economy
Climate geoengineering technologies

Future Trends:

Climate change accelerating (4-6°C scenarios by 2100)
Technological change exponential (AI, biotech, quantum)
Geopolitical fragmentation (bloc formation, partial decoupling)
Demographic shifts (aging in developed world, youth bulges in developing world)
Resource scarcity (water, rare earths, agricultural land)

Policy Frameworks:

Emerging technology governance (AI safety, biotech regulation, space traffic management)
Climate finance and technology transfer
Digital economy governance (data flows, cross-border e-commerce)
Critical infrastructure protection for cyber-physical systems

Learning Outcomes

Anticipate future coercion forms using emerging technologies
Manage complexity of simultaneous multi-domain crises
Identify policy gaps where existing tools are inadequate
Design adaptive strategies for rapidly changing technological landscape
Balance cooperation and competition in shared challenge domains

hashtagTabletop Exercise: Taiwan Strait Economic Coercion Crisis

hashtagScenario Overview

hashtagParticipant Roles

hashtagTimeline and Injects

hashtagPhase 1: Initial Crisis Response (Minutes 0-20)

hashtagPhase 2: Allied Coordination and Chinese Threats (Minutes 20-45)

hashtagPhase 3: Escalation and Decision Point (Minutes 45-70)

hashtagPhase 4: Debrief and Analysis (Minutes 70-90)

hashtagBackground Materials

hashtagFacilitator Notes

hashtagLearning Outcomes

hashtagFurther Reading

hashtagKey Terms for Research

hashtagTabletop Exercise: Semiconductor Chokepoint Crisis

hashtagScenario Overview

hashtagParticipant Roles

hashtagTimeline and Injects

hashtagPhase 1: Immediate Crisis (Minutes 0-20)

hashtagPhase 2: Chinese Pressure and Allied Divergence (Minutes 20-45)

hashtagPhase 3: Long-Term Strategy Decision (Minutes 45-70)

hashtagPhase 4: Debrief and Analysis (Minutes 70-90)

hashtagBackground Materials

hashtagFacilitator Notes

hashtagLearning Outcomes

hashtagFurther Reading

hashtagTabletop Exercise: Critical Minerals Crisis and Supply Disruption

hashtagScenario Overview

hashtagParticipant Roles

hashtagTimeline and Injects

hashtagPhase 1: Immediate Supply Crisis (Minutes 0-20)

hashtagPhase 2: Allied Divergence and Alternative Sources (Minutes 20-45)

hashtagPhase 3: Strategic Decisions and Escalation Risk (Minutes 45-70)

hashtagPhase 4: Debrief and Analysis (Minutes 70-90)

hashtagBackground Materials

hashtagFacilitator Notes

hashtagLearning Outcomes

hashtagFurther Reading

hashtagTabletop Exercise: AI Export Control Dilemma

hashtagScenario Overview

hashtagParticipant Roles

hashtagTimeline and Injects

hashtagPhase 1: Assessment and Options (Minutes 0-20)

hashtagPhase 2: Industry and Allied Reactions (Minutes 20-45)

hashtagPhase 3: Escalation and Strategic Choices (Minutes 45-70)

hashtagPhase 4: Debrief and Analysis (Minutes 70-90)

hashtagBackground Materials

hashtagFacilitator Notes

hashtagLearning Outcomes

hashtagFurther Reading

hashtagTabletop Exercise: Submarine Cable Sabotage and Digital Infrastructure Crisis

hashtagScenario Overview

hashtagParticipant Roles

hashtagTimeline and Injects

hashtagPhase 1: Initial Response (Minutes 0-20)

hashtagPhase 2: Attribution and Chinese Pressure (Minutes 20-45)

hashtagPhase 3: Strategic Response and Escalation Control (Minutes 45-70)

hashtagPhase 4: Debrief (Minutes 70-90)

hashtagBackground Materials

hashtagFacilitator Notes

hashtagLearning Outcomes

hashtagFurther Reading

hashtagTabletop Exercise: Tariff Escalation and Trade War Dynamics

hashtagScenario Overview

hashtagParticipant Roles

hashtagTimeline and Injects

hashtagPhase 1: Initial Retaliation (Minutes 0-20)

hashtagPhase 2: Allied Pressure and Third-Party Effects (Minutes 20-45)

hashtagPhase 3: Escalation or De-escalation (Minutes 45-70)

hashtagPhase 4: Debrief (Minutes 70-90)

hashtagBackground Materials

hashtagLearning Outcomes

hashtagFurther Reading

hashtagTabletop Exercise: Designing a Comprehensive Financial Sanctions Regime

hashtagScenario Overview

hashtagParticipant Roles

hashtagTimeline and Injects

hashtagPhase 1: Sanctions Design (Minutes 0-20)

hashtagPhase 2: Enforcement and Evasion (Minutes 20-45)

hashtagPhase 3: Strategic Trade-offs and Geopolitical Complications (Minutes 45-70)

hashtagPhase 4: Debrief (Minutes 70-90)

Tabletop Exercise: Taiwan Strait Economic Coercion Crisis

Scenario Overview

Participant Roles

Timeline and Injects

Phase 1: Initial Crisis Response (Minutes 0-20)

Phase 2: Allied Coordination and Chinese Threats (Minutes 20-45)

Phase 3: Escalation and Decision Point (Minutes 45-70)

Phase 4: Debrief and Analysis (Minutes 70-90)

Background Materials

Facilitator Notes

Learning Outcomes

Further Reading

Key Terms for Research

Tabletop Exercise: Semiconductor Chokepoint Crisis

Scenario Overview

Participant Roles

Timeline and Injects

Phase 1: Immediate Crisis (Minutes 0-20)

Phase 2: Chinese Pressure and Allied Divergence (Minutes 20-45)

Phase 3: Long-Term Strategy Decision (Minutes 45-70)

Phase 4: Debrief and Analysis (Minutes 70-90)

Background Materials

Facilitator Notes

Learning Outcomes

Further Reading

Tabletop Exercise: Critical Minerals Crisis and Supply Disruption

Scenario Overview

Participant Roles

Timeline and Injects

Phase 1: Immediate Supply Crisis (Minutes 0-20)

Phase 2: Allied Divergence and Alternative Sources (Minutes 20-45)

Phase 3: Strategic Decisions and Escalation Risk (Minutes 45-70)

Phase 4: Debrief and Analysis (Minutes 70-90)

Background Materials

Facilitator Notes

Learning Outcomes

Further Reading

Tabletop Exercise: AI Export Control Dilemma

Scenario Overview

Participant Roles

Timeline and Injects

Phase 1: Assessment and Options (Minutes 0-20)

Phase 2: Industry and Allied Reactions (Minutes 20-45)

Phase 3: Escalation and Strategic Choices (Minutes 45-70)

Phase 4: Debrief and Analysis (Minutes 70-90)

Background Materials

Facilitator Notes

Learning Outcomes

Further Reading

Tabletop Exercise: Submarine Cable Sabotage and Digital Infrastructure Crisis

Scenario Overview

Participant Roles

Timeline and Injects

Phase 1: Initial Response (Minutes 0-20)

Phase 2: Attribution and Chinese Pressure (Minutes 20-45)

Phase 3: Strategic Response and Escalation Control (Minutes 45-70)

Phase 4: Debrief (Minutes 70-90)

Background Materials

Facilitator Notes

Learning Outcomes

Further Reading

Tabletop Exercise: Tariff Escalation and Trade War Dynamics

Scenario Overview

Participant Roles

Timeline and Injects

Phase 1: Initial Retaliation (Minutes 0-20)

Phase 2: Allied Pressure and Third-Party Effects (Minutes 20-45)

Phase 3: Escalation or De-escalation (Minutes 45-70)

Phase 4: Debrief (Minutes 70-90)

Background Materials

Learning Outcomes

Further Reading

Tabletop Exercise: Designing a Comprehensive Financial Sanctions Regime

Scenario Overview

Participant Roles

Timeline and Injects

Phase 1: Sanctions Design (Minutes 0-20)

Phase 2: Enforcement and Evasion (Minutes 20-45)

Phase 3: Strategic Trade-offs and Geopolitical Complications (Minutes 45-70)

Phase 4: Debrief (Minutes 70-90)